中小企业贷款问题的进化博弈分析

An Evolutional Game Analysis of the Middle——and Small-Enterprises’ Difficulty in Loan Application

贷款难是中小企业发展中普遍面临的问题。基于企业和银行等金融机构之间的信息不对称，考查了企业在获得银行信用贷款后，银行核查力度和企业做假骗贷的影响因素，给出了银企博弈的一个动态模型，并运用进化博弈理论时该博弈模型进行了复制动态分析，从深层次上分析了中小企业贷款难问题的原因并给出了政策建议。

Middle - and small - enterprises have been playing an important role in Chinese national economy. However, the development of these enterprises is constrained by their difficulty of applying for loans, as is due to the information asymmetry between middle - and small - enterprises and the financial institutes. This paper focuses on the influences of banks＇ verification after the banks granted loans to the enterprises and the enterprises＇ obtaining loans by fraud on above - mentioned difficulty. First and foremost, this paper introduces a dynamic game theoretical model of bank - and - enterprise. Then it makes a duplicated analysis on the game theoretical model utilizing the evolutional game theory. Finally this paper discusses the reasons for the enterprises＇ difficulty in applying for loans and proposes some pieces of policy suggestion.