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信息不对称下军事采购的激励性规制 被引量:1

Stimulating Regulation of Military Procurement under Asymmetric information
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摘要 在分析军事采购活动信息不对称的基础上,对比完全信息和不对称信息下军事采购的最优激励机制,并提出具体的规制措施。 On the basis of information asymmetry, the paper compares the optimized incentive mechanism between full information and asymmetric information in the military procurement activities and gives out the concrete measures.
作者 田彦刚
机构地区 军事经济学院
出处 《物流技术》 2006年第12期94-96,共3页 Logistics Technology
关键词 信息不对称 军事采购 激励性规制 逆向选择 道德风险 information asymmetry military procurement stimulating regulation reverse selection moral hazard
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