审计师变更与审计收费——两种理论的检验

Audit Change and Audit Fees: A Test of Two Theories

关于审计师变更是否会导致审计收费折扣存在交易成本和信息披露两种理论。通过收集中国自2001年年报公布审计收费数据以来的所有审计师变更数据,研究了审计师变更与审计收费的关系,以验证两种理论在中国的适用性。研究发现,审计师变更时存在明显的审计收费折扣现象,其折扣幅度为5.5%,进一步研究显示只有2001年的监管性变更存在显著的审计收费折扣现象,而自愿性变更不存在这一现象,上述结果更多地支持了信息披露理论,即审计收费信息公开披露后不存在明显的审计收费折扣现象,这说明在中国审计市场上并不存在明显的低价揽客行为。

Two completing theories of initial engagement audit pricing are examined empirically in China. They are theories of DeAngelo＇s ＂transaction costs＂ and Dye＇s ＂information disclosure＂. This paper collects all initial engagements from 2001 of audit fees＇ public disclosure, and finds that initial engagement exists in China, but only for supervisory changes in 2001. Therefore the findings support the Dye＇s ＂informational disclosure theory＂, that is when audit fees are publicly disclosed, there will no initial engagement discounting.