政府产权利益下不良资产生成机制探讨

The Analysis of the Cause of Non-performing Loans Based on Government Property Right System

通过建立两阶段的动态博弈模型,分析了政府与国有银行之间的利益博弈行为,认为国有银行不良资产之所以仍然不断涌现,是由于政府对银行产权份额的过多控制而导致的。提出了推进彻底的银行产权制度改革,完善银行的法人治理结构的建议,以便从根本上减少银行的不良资产。

By establishing a two-staged dynamic game model,this paper reveals that the non-performing assets of the state-owned commercial bank are mainly caused by the game strategies between the government and the state-owned commercial bank in order to maximize their respectively interest. Furthermore, the paper suggests to embark on the complete property right system reform and improve structure of corporate governance to reduce the non-performing loan thoroughly.