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公司治理结构对代理成本的影响——来自中国上市公司的经验证据 被引量:66

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摘要 本文使用中国上市公司截面数据,应用一系列OLS回归对公司治理结构与代理成本之间的关系进行经验检验。本文提供的经验证据表明,管理者持股与代理成本不成显著关系;第一大股东持股比例在一定程度上与代理成本正相关;少数大股东联盟能在一定程度上减少代理成本;代理成本随着股东数量的增加而增加;董事会规模与代理成本正相关;独立董事和债务融资不能有效地控制代理成本。
出处 《财贸经济》 CSSCI 北大核心 2006年第12期29-35,共7页 Finance & Trade Economics
基金 国家自然基金(项目批准号为70673054和70472048) 中国博士后科学基金(编号为2005038065和2005038092)的阶段性成果。
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参考文献15

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二级参考文献59

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