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中间层组织的互补性博弈及其协调机制 被引量:6

Complimentary Games in Hybrid Organizations and Its Coordination Mechanisms
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摘要 中间层组织中各行为主体的互动活动往往具有策略互补性。运用互补性博弈的分析方法,考察中间层组织中各行为主体选择其努力水平的相互依赖性如何影响多重纳什均衡的结构,同时,考察哪些重要的协调机制有助于避免由于策略不确定性等导致的协调失败问题。 The strategic interaction between different players in hybrid organizations was analyzed by utilizing the approach of complimentary gaming, which helps to better understand how the interdependence between players' strategic choices influence the structure of multiple equilibria. Important coordination mechanisms were also discussed, which helps to avoid the coordination failure that raised by strategic uncertainty.
出处 《科技进步与对策》 CSSCI 北大核心 2006年第11期167-169,共3页 Science & Technology Progress and Policy
关键词 中间层组织 互补性博弈 策略互补性 hybrid organizations complimentary games strategic complementarities coordination
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参考文献7

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