电力市场中的串谋溢价和串谋行为规制

Research on Colluding Premium Price and Collusion Behaviours Regulation in Electricity Market

对发电侧电力市场2级委托?代理机制下的发电商1类串谋子契约(即作为代理人的发电商之间的串谋行为)进行了深入研究。首先分析了发电商的串谋行为对市场溢价的影响,溢价水平与发电商联盟的市场份额成正比,与市场需求弹性成反比;然后分析了电网阻塞对发电商串谋的影响,指出电能输出受限的区域发生串谋的原因大多是为了防止过度恶性竞争,电能受入阻塞的区域发生串谋的原因大多是为了追求高额垄断利润;最后对我国电力市场规制串谋行为的法律依据进行了研究,提出了根据现有技术水平设计合理强度的负激励机制来有效抑制串谋行为的方法,该方法对于市场监管和运行机构均具有重要的借鉴意义。

The ftrst kind of subordinate collusion contracts, i.e., the colluding behavoir among the generation companies acting as agents, under two grades principal-agent mechanism of electricity market is thoroughly studied. First, the influence of colluding behaviors among generation companies on market premium is analyzed, the premium level is in direct proportion to the market share of collusion union and in inverse proportion to market demand elasticity. Then the influence of power network congestion on collusion is analyzed and it is pointed out that the collusion emerged in regions where power output is limited is usually to prevent malignant competition; and the collusion emerged in regions where power input is limited is usually to pursue the high monopoly profit. Finally, the legal basis to regulate colluding behavoir in electricity market in China is studied, and a method to effectively regulate colluding behavoir by negative incentive mechanism with rational intensity that is designed according to existing technical level is proposed. It might be available for reference to both market supervision and operating department.