摘要
以我国大用户直购电试点现行的转运定价机制为基础,结合区域电力市场的运营现状,建立发电商、大用户和电网公司在直购电模式下的收益模型,并对各市场主体之间的利益博弈行为进行分析,找出达成直购电交易的必要条件,最后结合算例得出结论。
Based on present wheeling cost mechanism of Chinese direct power-purchase pilot for large consumers and the operation realities of Rcgional Electricity Market, earning models of power produccrs, large consumers and power transmission company undcr direct power-purchase pattern are established to analyze gaming behaviors of market members, and the necessary condition of direct power-purchase is deduced. Finally, some conclusions are presented through a calculation example.
出处
《能源工程》
2006年第6期21-25,共5页
Energy Engineering
关键词
直购电
转运定价机制
收益模型
博弈行为
direct power-purchase
wheeling cost mechanism
earning model
gaming behavior