我国政府扶贫机制再造研究

Renovation of Chinese Government's Poverty Alleviation Mechanism

目前我国政府在农村的扶贫效率日渐低下,其中一个重要原因就是政府扶贫体制的组织效率低下。为了设计出一个激励相容的扶贫机制,以提高政府扶贫效率,本文在考虑了各种实际情况下,运用委托代理理论,对中央政府与地方政府扶贫制度进行了重新设计。文章认为中央政府应对地方政府进行激励,并且其绩效考核的标准不仅包括贫困人口减少的数量,还应包括其他变量(如当地自然条件、经济环境等),同时在扶贫资金的拨付上,采取分期付款的方式,以应对由于生命周期的缘故而导致的地方政府不合作行为。

The efficiency of Chinese Government＇s poverty alleviation in rural areas has been on the decline in recent years. One of the important reasons is that the institutional efficiency of the government poverty alleviation is low. This article proposes a renovation of the central government and local government poverty alleviation mechanism, borrowing on the principal-agent theory and weighing various factors. The authors maintain that the central government should provide incentives for the local government, and the evaluation criteria should include not only the decrease of the number of poor population, but also other variables such as the environment and economical environment, etc. In addition, poverty alleviation funds should be delivered in installments to avoid the non - cooperation behavior of local governments due to the life cycle reasons.