考虑需求侧竞价情况下的竞价上网策略研究

Bidding strategies for interconnection to grids based on demand side bidding

运用微观经济学理论研究了单边开放的电力市场中考虑需求侧竞价的竞价上网策略问题。基于供给函数均衡模型建立了考虑需求侧竞价的发电商竞价策略模型,证明发电商的优化竞价策略是报价高于边际成本;需求侧竞价的存在可有效地降低发电商的报价。论证了需求侧竞价情况下市场均衡解存在且唯一,并探讨了均衡解和市场力之间的关系,证明差价合约对均衡解和发电商市场力的影响。

The microeconomics was applied to study the bidding strategies for interconnection to grids based on demand side bidding in a unilateral open electricity market. Based on the supply function equilibrium model, the bidding strategy model for power suppliers with consideration of the demand side bidding is developed, which proves that the improved bidding strategy is characterized by higher bids than the marginal cost, and the demand side bidding can effectively reduce the bid. It is concluded that with demand side bidding the market equilibrium solution is exclusive. The relation between the equilibrium solution and the market force is discussed, and the influence of the Contract for Difference on the equilibrium solution and the market force is studied.