摘要
通过分析高技术产业厂商及其雇员的经济行为变化和特点,并基于创业型雇员是进入市场唯一威胁的前提假设,可证明两个命题:(1)当新进入者进入成本较低时,在位者缺乏雇用雇员的积极性;(2)雇员由于被在位者设定的跳槽壁垒套牢而缺乏进入动机,即自我创业的动机。由此还可产生以下逻辑推论:(1)政府实施的各种优惠政策无助于激励为高技术产业在位者扩大就业规模;(2)在位者设定的跳槽壁垒所导致的高工资刚性降低了高技术产业就业需求。
Based on the analysis on changes and characteristics of employees＇ and employers＇ economic behaviors in hi-tech industry, and the assumption that the only threat to enter the industry is the employees who want to start a firm, this paper tries to prove the two propositions as following： （a） employers do not want to increase employment if the new comers enter with low costs; （b） employees are lack of motives to enter because of the existing harriers to job-hopping. Also, this paper gets two deductions as this： （a） government policies are not helpful for the employers in the hi-tech industry to increase the employment; （b） the wage rigidity resulting from the barriers to job-hopping decreases the labor demand in hitech industry.
出处
《经济理论与经济管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第12期51-56,共6页
Economic Theory and Business Management
关键词
高技术产业
博弈模型
就业粘性
无就业增长
hi-tech industry
game model
employment stickiness
growth without employment increase
