主导型供应链的Stackelberg利润分配博弈

A Stackelberg Game of Profit Division in Supply Chains with Dominant Firms

考虑一个由一个供应商和零售商组成的二级供应链,建立了供应链和零售商的S tacke lberg利润分配博弈模型,并引入收入共享契约作为利润再分配的手段,分别分析了供应链主导型和零售商主导型供应链的利润分配均衡。研究表明,主导企业可以运用权力使得从属地位的企业只能获得保留利润,而自己获得供应链所有的剩余利润,并且主导企业制定的利润分配参数能够使供应链达到最优利润水平。然而,如果主导企业放弃强制权力,不仅自身的利润受损,供应链整体也将低效运作。

This paper considers a two-stage supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer and establishes Stackelberg games of profit division. Revenue sharing contracts are employed in the games as a profit division approach. Equilibrium analysis shows that the dominate firm can only get the reserved profit, while the dominant firm can obtain all the profit leaved. And the parameters made by the dominant firm can coordinate the supply chain to the optimal level. However, if the dominant firm gives up the dominating chance, his profit will decrease and the supply chain will aiso operate inefficiently.