摘要
现行的强制性信息披露制度与外部审计制度不能有效解决信息不对称条件下股票市场投资不足的问题。文章探讨了商业银行监督对缓解股票市场中信息不对称问题的作用,通过银企博弈模型研究了优质公司借助商业银行控制贷款规模来传递信号,向投资者表明自身为绩优企业,从而达到有效解决投资不足问题的可行性。
Asymmetric information may cause underinvestment in stock markets. Compulsory information releasing system and external auditing system are unable to solve the problem efficiently. Based on former researches,this paper analyzes the surveillance of commercial bank in solving the information asymmetric problem in stock market. Furthermore, it analyzes the feasibility that high valued firms reveal their type by managing the scale of the loans to resolve the underinvestment problem.
出处
《湖南商学院学报》
2006年第6期87-89,共3页
Journal of Hunan Business College
关键词
信息不对称
投资不足
商业银行
information asymmctry
underinvestment
commercial bank