组织中激励契约设计的经济学思考

Economic Thinking about Designing Incentive Contracts in Organization

组织中设计的激励契约是否科学合理,是调动组织成员工作积极性,不断提高工作效率的关键。基于委托代理理论,研究所有权和经营权分离状态下,所有者与经营者之间的委托代理关系以及由此产生的代理成本和代理收益。基于人力资本理论,研究人力资本产权的私有性、人力资本产权残缺的自贬性、人力资本产权的依附性以及人力资本产权的不可抵押性。委托代理理论和人力资本理论为组织内激励契约的设计提供了经济学基础。

Whether incentive contracts are scientific and reasonable or not is the key to mobilize workers＇ positivity and to improve work efficiency. According to the Principle-Agent Theory, we study the principal-agent relation between the owner and operator, and the resulting agent cost and agent benefit. According to the Human Capital Theory, we argue that the human capital has the nature of private ownership, handicapped self-debasement, dependence and un-mortgage. So these two theories can provide economic basis for designing incentive contract in organizations.