摘要
We introduce an attack scheme for eavesdropping freely the ping-pong quantum communication protocol proposed by Bostrǒm and Felbinger [Phys. Rev. Left. 89, 187902 （2002）] in a noise channel. The vicious eavesdropper, Eve, intercepts and measures the travel photon transmitted between the sender and the receiver. Then she replaces the quantum signal with a multi-photon signal in the same state, and measures the returned photons with the measuring basis, with which Eve prepares the fake signal except for one photon. This attack increases neither the quantum channel losses nor the error rate in the sampling instances for eavesdropping check. It works for eavesdropping the secret message transmitted with the ping-pong protocol. Finally, we propose a way for improving the security of the ping-pong protocol.
We introduce an attack scheme for eavesdropping freely the ping-pong quantum communication protocol proposed by Bostrǒm and Felbinger [Phys. Rev. Left. 89, 187902 （2002）] in a noise channel. The vicious eavesdropper, Eve, intercepts and measures the travel photon transmitted between the sender and the receiver. Then she replaces the quantum signal with a multi-photon signal in the same state, and measures the returned photons with the measuring basis, with which Eve prepares the fake signal except for one photon. This attack increases neither the quantum channel losses nor the error rate in the sampling instances for eavesdropping check. It works for eavesdropping the secret message transmitted with the ping-pong protocol. Finally, we propose a way for improving the security of the ping-pong protocol.
基金
Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China （Grant No 10604008） and the Beijing Education Committee （Grant No XK100270454）.
