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控制权收益的经济学分析 被引量:4

Economics Analysis of Control Rights Benefit
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摘要 获取控制权的私人利益是股权集中的主要原因。在公司的控制权配置中,大股东拥有的控制权优势,使其具有了获取控制权私人收益的能力,同时,在大股东与小股东之间存在的委托代理关系,又使大股东具有了谋取控制权私人收益的动力。改进上市公司投票制度,限制大股东的投票权可以从根本上减少大股东的控制权私人收益。 The main reason for concentration of ownership structure is to obtain control rights for private interest. Big shareholders are privileged to possess control rights in the corporation, which enable them to possess control rights for private interests. The relationship of commission agent between large shareholders and minor shareholders entitle large shareholders to control rights for private interests. To restrict large shareholder's vote right by improving corporate vote system can reduce private benefit of large shareholder's control rights.
作者 侯晓红
出处 《中国矿业大学学报(社会科学版)》 2006年第4期74-78,共5页 Journal of China University of Mining & Technology(Social Sciences)
关键词 控制 控制权收益 产权理论 代理理论 control rights private benefit of control rights property right theory agent theory
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