环境管制过程中的管制者与被管制者行为分析

Analysis on Behavior of the Regulator and the Polluters

环境污染的经济负外部性对污染者具有激励作用,因此,解决环境问题的关键是对污染者加以管制。作为管制者的政府,需要了解排污者的污染严重程度,并据此限制和惩罚排污者的负外部性,作为被管制对象的排污者,有的要隐瞒真相,适避惩罚。本文在环境污染的经济外部性和一般消除对策分析的基础上,通过分析环境管制过程中管制者和被管制者之间的博弈对策和行为,说明了惩罚的轻重程度导致的结果决然不同。博弈的最优策略表明,只有一定数额的排污罚金才可以起到惩治的作用,高额罚金不仅可以激励排污者真实披露污染信息,为污染治理提供科学依据,还可以降低政府的检测概率,减少政府在管制过程中的交易成本,因此,以高额度的罚金管制污染者应成为政府重要的管制手段。

The key measure of solving the environment problem is to regulate the polluters because the economy externality of pollution encourages the behavior of the polluters. As a regulator, the government has to know the properties of the pollutants by which the polluters can be punished and their behavior can be restricted. As the regulated, the polluters should be encouraged to lie low the pollution information to avoid the punishment. Based on the analysis of economy externality of pollution and the control measure, the paper analyzes the game and the behavior of the regulator and the polluters. The analysis shows that the regulated result is interrelated with the sum of fines and the more severe punishment will encourage the polluters to reveal the pollution information and help the regulator to reduce the supervision cost and make the operational countermeasure to improve the environmental quality.