摘要
产权植根于习俗。理解了习俗产权,现代产权理论必然获得无限生机与活力。农地习俗产权的起源可以通过一个简单的博弈模型得到说明。该模型表明,在没有第三方设计的条件下,我们如何在土地资源稀缺的情况下自组织成一种互惠互利的习俗元产权制度。同时,经验研究的结果不仅对这一理论模型提供了某种程度的支持,而且也有助于我们更好地理解农地习俗产权元制度的起源。
Property right is rooted in customs. The modem theory of property right will surely get infinite vigor and vitality if customary property right is understood. The origin of customary property right of farmland can be illustrated by a simile game model. This model shows how we can organize a mutually beneficial customary proto - institution of property right automatically without a third party's designing under the condition of scarce land resources. At the same time the result of the empirical research not only provides this theory with support to some degree, but also helps us understand better the origin of customary property right proto - institution of farmland.
出处
《经济经纬》
CSSCI
北大核心
2007年第1期122-124,共3页
Economic Survey
基金
洪名勇主持的国家社科基金课题<马克思土地产权理论与中国农地产权制度改革实践
创新研究>(06XJL001)
贵州省优秀青年科技人才基金课题<欠发达地区农地内在制度与外在产权制度的实证研究>(黔科合人字(2002)0212号)
教育部春晖计划课题<贵州省农地改革试验区农地制度变迁研究>(S2004-2-52002)的阶段性成果
关键词
农地习俗产权
起源
博弈模型
经验研究
customary property right of farmland
origin
game model
empirical research