期刊文献+

产业演进下的企业组织的形式及抉择 被引量:2

On Organizational Make-ups of Enterprises and Their Choices in the Industrial Evolution
下载PDF
导出
摘要 企业组织不是新古典经济学抽象下的生产函数,它有它不同的组织形式。在不同的组织形式下,企业组织之间有着相当的差别。同时在现实经济中企业组织并非是新古典经济学定义的天然物,它有其自身的逻辑起点,即是企业家人力资本的间接定价器。鉴于新古典经济学对企业组织的种种误读,本文尝试着从不同的角度去理解企业组织,并分析不同的企业组织形式之间的差异。同时说明为什么不同的企业组织会选择不同的组织形式,并在此基础上建立一个企业组织形式的相机抉择模型。 The organizational make-ups of enterprises aren' t production function as abstracted concepts under the Neo-economics, and they have their particular organizational shapes. The paper points out that among the enterprises disparities exist in forms of the organizational make-ups, and that the realistic economy proves that the organizational make-ups aren't natural things defined by the Neo-economics. Rather, they are featuring indirect pricing-instrument of human resources of the entrepreneur. By exposing the misunderstanding of organizational make-up theory of the Neo-economics,the paper addresses the isssue from different perspectives by firstly analyzing the differences of the diversified organizational forms, and then illuminating why different enterprises choose different organizational make-ups. Finally,a motivation-based model for choosing organizational forms is presented.
作者 隋广军 陈和
机构地区 暨南大学
出处 《国际经贸探索》 CSSCI 北大核心 2007年第1期30-35,共6页 International Economics and Trade Research
基金 国家社会科学基金项目(06BJY052) 广东省软科学基金项目(2005B70101007)
关键词 企业组织形式 企业家的企业组织 资本家的企业组织 劳动者管理的企业组织 相机抉择 organizational make -up of enterprises entrepreneurial organizational make -up capitalistic organizational make-up workership-managed organizational make-up discretionary
  • 相关文献

参考文献13

  • 1约瑟夫·奈特.风险、不确定性与利润[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社.2005.
  • 2申明浩.“企业家控制”的企业剩余权细分[J].改革,2005(4):81-86. 被引量:5
  • 3朱卫平.以企业家为中心签约人的创业企业融资契约模型[J].学术研究,2005(10):40-47. 被引量:7
  • 4Alchian Armen and Demsetz Harold.Production,Information Costs, and Economic Organization [J]. American Economic Review, 1972,62:777-795.
  • 5Williamson Oliver. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism:Firms, Markets, and Relational Contracting [M]. New York: The Free Press, 1985.
  • 6Hart Oliver. Firms,Contracts and Financial Structure[M]. Oxford University Press, 1995.
  • 7杨瑞龙,卢周来.对劳动管理型企业的经济学研究:一个方法论的述评[J].中国社会科学,2005(2):47-55. 被引量:13
  • 8Dow Scott. Governing the Firm: Workers'Control in Theory and Practice[M]. Cambridge University Press, 2003.
  • 9Jensen Michael,and Meckling William. Rights and Production Functions:An Application to Labor-Managed Firm and Codeterminatio[J]. Journal of Business, 1979,52: 469-506.
  • 10Aghion Philippe and Bolton Patrick.An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting [J].Review of Economic Studies, 1992,59: 473-494.

二级参考文献36

  • 1周其仁.市场里的企业:一个人力资本与非人力资本的特别合约[J].经济研究,1996,31(6):71-79. 被引量:2168
  • 2汪丁丁.企业家的形成与财产制度——评张维迎《企业的企业家—契约理论》[J].经济研究,1996,31(1):62-68. 被引量:30
  • 3科斯.企业的性质.论生产的制度结构[M].上海三联书店,1994.1-24.
  • 4Bonin, John P. and Louis Putterman, Economics of Cooperation and the Labor-Managed Economy. New York: Harwood, 1987.
  • 5Dow, Gregory K. , Governing the Firm: Workers' Control in Theory and Practice. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
  • 6Dreze, Jacques, Labour Management, Contracts and Capital Markets: A General Equilibrium Approach. Oxford: Blaekwell, 1990.
  • 7Jensen, Michael C. and William H. Meckling, Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-Managed Firm and Codetermination. Journal of Business, 52 (4), 1979.
  • 8Tirole, Jean, Corporate Governance. Econometrica, 69(1), 2001.
  • 9Vanek, Jaroslav, Sel f-Management : Economic Liberation of Man. Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1975.
  • 10Williamson, Oliver E. , The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: The Free Press, 1985.

共引文献1568

同被引文献14

引证文献2

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部