理想状态下网络非线性交叉干扰激励价控策略

Nonlinear and crossing influences incentive pricing control strategy for network systems with ideal state

针对多用户多优先级网络系统的管理问题,利用对策论中的Nash平衡和激励Stackelberg策略等相关概念,提出了理想状态下的激励价控策略设计.在系统的动态平衡状态下,利用信息量的瞬时变化率及用户与平衡点的偏离,给出了非线性交叉干扰的多激励价控策略,加强了用户与网络管理者的合作性,激励和引导非合作用户选取对系统整体有益的服务请求,以提高网络资源的利用率.

Using the concepts of Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg incentive strategy in the game theory, the incentive pricing control strategy is devised for the management problem of the multi-user multi-prlority system. In the ideal state, the nonlinear and crossing influence incentive pricing strategy is presented to encourage and guide the noncooperative users to select the serving request, which intensifies the cooperation of the users and network, and increases the using of network resource rate by using the instantaneous change of rate on network and deviating from the state equilibrium point.