企业战略联盟稳定性的动态博弈分析

The Dynamic Game Analysis on the Stability of the Corporations′ Strategic Alliance

在完全信息博弈模型与不完全信息博弈模型两种框架下,讨论不同产品关系的企业战略联盟建立及其稳定性问题.研究表明,企业建立战略联盟存在着“囚徒困境”的问题,但企业为了获取长期利益最大化,会放弃短期利益,进而建立并保持长期的战略联盟.当然,要在现实中实现它,也需要设计一定的硬性制度来保障;而企业间的产品关系对企业战略联盟的稳定性起到关键性的作用,文中进而得出纵向联盟形式是最为有效的联盟形式.

In this paper, we discuss the corporations how to build and keep up with the strategic alliance with the game analysis model under the condition of the completed information and the uncompleted information. The result shows that if it wants to build the strategic alliance, the corporations will face up with the ＂prisoners＇ dilemma＂, unless the corporations try to reap the long profit. Some special system is also demanded in reality. At last the relationship of product between different enterprise is also the key to the strategic alliance stability. Then the portrait alliance is the most effective mode.