省会城市预算过程中党政首长的作用与影响——基于三个省会城市的研究

The Role and Effect of Mayor and Secretary of Municipal Committee of the CPC in Budgetary Process of Capital City of Province

以我国三个省会城市为例来试图回答这样一个问题:在省会城市预算过程中,党政首长究竟发挥着怎样的作用,他们是如何影响着预算过程和预算改革的?研究发现,这三个省会城市预算改革后,预算权力结构并未从根本上改变。其核心仍然是市委书记和市长,他们仍然是地方预算过程中实际的财政资源申请的审批者或最终资源配置者。这主要体现在,预算改革后,市委领导下的“行政预算”体制的继续,市政府领导高层预算分配权力的相对集中,和市长对部门关系以及部门利益的决定性影响。研究还指出,要准确地表达地方党政首长在预算过程中的权力,需要将其放在一种“关系”的维度来具体化。此外,对预算环境的讨论也是必要的,尤其是政治环境,对于党政首长而言,预算过程中的不确定性通常都是和政治环境相联系的。

The questions in this study are what roles do mayor and secretary of sub-national committee of the CPC play in budgetary process and budgetary reform, and how to influence them? Based on the investigation of three capital cities of provinces, the results indicate that the structure of budgetary power has not been changed substantially after budgetary reform in those capital cities and the core budgetary power is still the mayor and secretary of Municipal Committee of the CPC, who are still the central to authorize and allocate financial resources eventually in the budgetary process, mainly reflecting in three aspects: continued 'executive budget' system under the leading of the Municipal Party Committee after budget reform, the relative concentration of budgetary power at the highest level of municipal government, and the mayor's decisive influence on inter-departmental relationship and interests of the department. Furthermore, it is necessary to reify the power of heads in the budgetary process with the dimension of 'relationship' to accurately reflect that power and to discuss the budgetary environment, especially political environment, since the uncertainty to municipal leaders in the budgetary process is usually related to it.