产权、代理成本和代理效率

Ownership, Agency Cost and Agency Efficiency

本文选择政府管制较少、竞争较为充分的电子电器行业作为研究对象,考察了产权制度与代理成本和代理效率的关系,得到以下结论:(1)在代理成本上,国有产权企业普遍高于混和产权企业,混和产权企业高于个人产权企业;在代理成本差异上,混和产权企业与个人产权企业的差异小于与国有产权企业的差异。(2)长期投资率和职工人数与代理成本呈显著正相关关系,而长期投资率、财务杠杆比率、职工人数等与代理效率呈显著负相关关系。(3)企业规模越大,不同产权的代理成本差异越小;反之代理成本差异越大。(4)随着市场竞争程度的提高,各类产权企业的代理成本都呈现下降趋势,其代理效率呈现提高趋势。我们研究的启示是国有企业改革的突破口应考虑如何降低其代理成本,解决的措施之一是产权改革,尤其是产权多元化的改革,其次是完善对投资和负债及冗员的监督和控制机制,以促进代理成本的降低和代理效率的提高。

This paper examines the relationships between ownership, agency cost and efficiency in Chinese transition economy. The main findings are as follows： （1） Agency cost of state-owned property rights is higher than that of diversified ownership, meanwhile the latter is higher than that of private property rights, and the agency cost differences between diversified ownership and private ownership is smaller than the differences between state-owned property rights and diversified ownership. （2）The ratio of long-term investments to assets and the number of employee are significantly positively related to agency cost, and the ratio of long-term investments to assets, financial leverage and the number of employee are significantly negatively relative with agency efficiency. （3） The differences of agency cost between alternative property rights are negatively relative with firms＇ scales. （4）With the strengthening of competition, the agency costs of various property rights are almost increasingly decreasing, and respectively the agency efficiency are gradually increasing. The direct implication of our study is that the objectives of the reform of SOEs should be focused on reducing the agency cost by means of promoting the reform of diversified property rights system, and establishing a efficient overseeing and controlling mechanism, otherwise SOEs will at last be extruded downright from rival market by private firms.