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水利工程中的业主和监理之间的委托代理博弈分析 被引量:7

Analysis of the Relationship between Owner and Supervisors in the Hydraulic Engineering
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摘要 现今监理市场有些监理单位为了追求利润的最大化,常常不选派高素质的监理人员或与承包商合谋来欺骗业主,从而造成业主利益的重大损失。为了遏制监理的这种行为,业主就需要与监理签订具有约束力的合同来约束监理的行为,使监理认真履行职责。博弈论就是解决对策主体利益均衡问题的重要方法。笔者以博弈论为基础,以业主的期望效用为目标函数,以监理的参与约束和激励相容约束为约束条件,对水利工程中的业主和监理之间的委托代理关系进行博弈分析,得出业主和监理之间签订的最优线性合同。 Nowadays, some supervisors pursues the maximum profits during supervisions by sending unqualified supervisors or cheating with the undertakers, and thus the owners suffered heavy loss in their benefits, in order to avoid its occurrence, the owners should sign the contracts with the supervisors to make the supervisors follow the rules. The game theory is an important method solving the problems of the benefit balance among the objects. In this paper, the game theory was taken as the study method;the owner's expecting value,as the objective function,and the participation of the supervisors and encouragemem,as the limited condition, then the gambling analysis of the relationship between owners and supervisors in the hydraulic engineering was studied and the optimum linear contract was obtained.
出处 《安徽农业科学》 CAS 北大核心 2007年第3期920-921,共2页 Journal of Anhui Agricultural Sciences
关键词 业主 监理 博弈分析 线性合同 Owner Supervisor Gambling analysis Linear contract
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