摘要
公用企业滥用垄断地位行为是管制改革和中国反垄断法中的核心问题。本文采用线性城市模型证明,管制改革中纵向经营在位企业具有采取排他性行为对新企业实行市场封锁的激励。在此情况下,混合型管制体制具有相对的效率优势。中国自然垄断行业具有自然垄断、行为垄断和行政垄断三重交织的特点,垄断性公用企业具有特殊的滥用行为产生机理和滥用行为方式。反公用企业滥用行为应建立“混合型”管制体制模式,将深化行业管制体制改革和反垄断执法有机的结合起来。
Public utilities＇ above behavior is the main problem in regulation reform and antimonopoly law in China. Based on linear city model, this paper proved that vertical monopoly has incentives to deter new finns entry with exclusive measures. Under this circumstance, the mixing regulation institution has efficiency advantage. There are natural monopoly, behavior monopoly, and administrative monopoly, and the public utilities have special abusive behaviors and incentives. The authors point the application of antimonopoly law should take mixing regulation institution to realize harminization between w.gulation and antimonopoly.
出处
《财经科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2007年第2期82-89,共8页
Finance & Economics
基金
※国家自然科学基金项目(70573087)和中国博士后基金项目(20060390305)
关键词
公用企业
滥用行为
混合型管制体制
public utilities
abusive behavior
mixing regulation institution
