企业质量战略的博弈分析

Game Analysis for Quality Strategy of Enterprises

企业在与顾客质量偏好的博弈中,以效用最大化为目标,在寻求产品质量投资与广告宣传投资水平的均衡点的过程中与竞争对手进行循环往复的博弈。通过建立质量战略博弈分析模型,对这一过程进行了分析与描述,并得出产品质量投资效用与广告宣传投资效用在不同竞争状态下交互变化的结论。

In the game of the customer＇s quality preferences, regsrd to maximize the effectiveness as target, the enterprise carries on cycle games with rivals in the process of seeking the equiuilibrium of investments in product quality and advertising. Through the model analysis of quality strategy game, the paper describes this process, and draws the conclusion of the investment in quality and in advertisement is interactive changing in different competition state.