一个可以揭示经理人私人信息的信息甄别模型

An Optimal Reward Contracts That Can Show a Manager′s Hidden Information

首先,分析了经理人隐匿信息的原因,其次,基于机制设计理论与显示原理建立了一个能够显示经理人私人信息的信息甄别模型,再次,运用优化分析工具在委托代理模型框架下给出了模型的最优解,最后,我们分析了最优报酬契约的性质.

Firstly, it analyzed reasons of manager hide information. Secondly, it discussed a reward-incentive mechanism that could show the manager＇s private information. Again, it gived out optimal solution in principal-agent framework. Finally, it analyzed kind of the optimal contracts.