公司治理中多重委托代理悖论与制度辅助——兼与冯根福商榷

Multi Principal-agents Paradox in Corporate Governance and the Institutional Complementarity

在股权高度集中或相对集中的上市公司,既要保障股东对经营者的监督效率,又要兼顾中小股东的利益保护是“鱼与熊掌”,内控机制无法单独解决这个两难问题,需要外部制度约束来作保障。在公司内部治理中,如果单重委托代理无法形成有效的激励和信息传递,那么多重委托代理必定是无效的。揭示了多重委托代理在机制设计中的悖论性,并从制度层面弥补了内控机制的局限性,提出了完善中国上市公司治理需要建立政府代理声誉、国家执法声誉和企业信息披露声誉,以及中小股东与大股东之间的良性信息传递机制。

This paper proved that keeping the monitor efficiency as well as the minority shareholders＇ benefit is all＇cult from the view of principal effectiveness. Meanwhile we find that individual internal control systems are inadequacy, and the external control systems are remedy. However, in order to elude the external control systems＇ locclization, this paper brings forward three reputations： reputation of government principal, reputation of law- executing and reputation of enterprise＇ information issuance, at the same time, to build a benitro signaling mechanism between eontrolling shareholders and minority shareholders is nceessarv.