摘要
从隐私论题出发,本文将精神事件定义为从内在的观点所得到的知觉,把物理事件定义为从外在的观点所得到的知觉,并以此为起点发展出一个关于心灵的知觉二元论。本文还试图以此理论来说明心灵哲学领域长期存在的心-物互动问题,试图恢复并证明笛卡尔和莱布尼兹曾经达到的某些观察和结论。知觉是心灵最本质的特征,本文在用知觉来定义精神事件和物理事件的同时也发展出一个关于知觉的新理论。
Starting with the privacy thesis,mental events are defined in the article as perceptions from an internal point of view and physical events as perceptions from an external point of view.Walking along the fine line between the mental and the physical,I develop a theory of mind,which explains some long-persisting ontological issues in philosophy of mind,such as the psycho-physical interaction.It also recovers some of the observations and conclusions achieved by Descartes and Leibniz.Perception is the most essential feature of mind.While I am defining mental/physical events in terms of perception,I also develop a theory of perception.
出处
《自然辩证法通讯》
CSSCI
北大核心
2007年第1期22-27,共6页
Journal of Dialectics of Nature
基金
国家教育部"985工程"华中科技大学"科学进步与人文精神"国家哲学社会科学创新基地
John Tem pleton Foundation GPSS Program(全球审视科学与精神研究项目"科学与人文精神"课题)研究成果