反垄断法中的杠杆作用——以美国法理论和实务为中心的分析

在美国早期的反垄断法理论和实务中,杠杆作用被理解为将一个市场上的垄断力量传递到另一个市场,从而同时获得两个市场垄断利润的方式。根据这一理论,法院在搭售案件中认定垄断者的搭售行为违法。但是,芝加哥学派的学者通过经济学的分析认为杠杆作用根本不存在,因为企业捆绑出售两种产品仅仅相当于提高垄断产品价格,必然造成需求下降,无法同时获取两个市场垄断利润。而进一步的理论研究发现,如果将杠杆作用视为企业策略行为的一部分,特别是通过提高竞争对手的成本而让自己获利的方式,则杠杆作用完全可以达到通过一个市场的垄断地位影响另一个市场的竞争状况,并在两个市场同时获利的结果。因此,策略行为理论,特别是RRC理论的发展,让杠杆作用的内涵得到更新和充实,并让理论分析更接近现实状况。

In early US antitrust law and practice, the leverage effect was understood as a way of transferring a monopoly from the market of one product to another, thereby getting monopoly profit in the markets of both products. Scholars of the Chicago School build model to prove that the leverage effect does not exist in re- ality because when the markets of two products are linked to each other, the This will inevitably lead to the decrease in demand for such products, making prices of the products will rise. it impossible to get the monopoly profit of both markets. However, if leverage effect is used as a strategy of raising the cost of rivals, it can indeed enable the monopoly enterprise to benefit from both markets. Therefore, the development of the strategy theories, especially RRC theory, have renewed and enriched the leverage theory and enabled its theoretical analysis to better reflect the economic reality.