经济转轨、契约设计与银行改革——基于多任务委托—代理理论的经济学分析

Economy Transition,Contract Design and Reform of Banking——Economics Analysis Based on Multi-task Principal-Agent Theory

当前中国正处于经济转轨时期,由于法律等相关制度尚不完善,银行腐败问题日益增多,而造成腐败不断扩大的一个重要原因是激励契约设计不合理。文章在多重任务委托—代理理论框架下讨论银行激励机制,并且用经验证据对激励效果进行了检验,结果表明以控制权收益为主的激励结构影响了银行效率,进而引发腐败问题。因此,解决腐败的关键是制度设计。

As a traansition economy, corruption in banking industry became increasingly serious because such relevant institutions as the law etc are deficient. Then what makes corruption becoming increasingly serious is mainly irrational incentive contract design. The paper studies incentive mechanism in banking industry in the framework of multi - task principal - agent and examines the effect of incertives with evidences. The result reveals that income from control rights accounts for a much larger part in the structure of incentives, which affects the efficiency of bank and further induces corruption. So the key to get rid of corruption is institutions design.