基于存货质押融资业务的阶段贷款最优决策研究

An Optimal Decision Study on Staged Ioaning in Warehouse Financing

存货质押融资业务作为解决中小企业融资的方式之一在国内外都有所发展,这种业务模式在解决银行和企业委托代理问题的同时,引入了新的银行与物流企业之间的委托代理问题。本文针对新的问题,引入阶段贷款的方法来控制风险和降低道德风险,运用参数函数比较了阶段贷款和一次性贷款的异同,得出了阶段贷款优于一次性贷款的结论,并通过运用合约作为阶段贷款的有效补充机制来更好的控制代理问题。

As one of the ways to solve SME financing difficulty warehouse financing, it is widely developed all over the world. While solving agent-principal problem of banks and enterprises, this pattern causes new agent-principal problem of banks and logistic enterprises. Staged financing is proposed in this paper to control risk and mitigate moral hazard. Using parametric functions and comparing staged financing with upfront financing, we get a closed-form solution and discover the superior properties of staged financing. In particular, we show that a sharing contract acts as an effective complementary mechanism of controlling agency problems for staged financing.