有限理性下的知识产权管理的进化博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Theory Analysis of Intellectual Property Right Management under Bounded rationality

本文以进化博弈理论为基础,以复制动态模型和微分方程的稳定性理论为分析工具,在知识产权的管理机关和知识产权的使用者均为有限理性的假设前提下,研究了在长期演化过程中,群体中选择不同策略的群体比例动态变动趋势和进化稳定性。并通过运用比较静态分析方法,得出了社会应加强对管理机关正确执法的舆论监督,企业应做好保护自有知识产权工作的结论。

This thesis is based on the evolutionary game theory. Replicated dynamic model and differential equation stability theory are adopted as basic analytical tools. Under the participator bounded rationality hypothesis, the research mainly introduces long-term evolution stability between the administrant government group and the intellectual property right users group. At the end of thesis, the correlative conclusion has been arrived at.