摘要
本文采用基于重复博弈的理论模型,对IPO询价制改革在我国证券市场出现的“南橘北枳”现象进行理论解释。我们认为,承销商是否拥有“配股权”构成了导致IPO定价询价机制在我国证券市场无法顺利发挥作用,相反却在美国证券市场成功运行的关键原因。
In this paper, we use a repeated game model to explain why the introduction of negotiated biding in China have different results from those in the other countries. And we conclude that it＇s the powerless of the underwriter in offerings right that caused the underpricing of IPOs in China.
出处
《国际金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2007年第2期37-42,共6页
Studies of International Finance
关键词
IPO定价
配股权
重复博弈
IPO Pricing
Rights of Offerings
Repeated Games.
