评斯密特对马克思认识概念的阐释——读阿尔弗雷德·斯密特《马克思的自然概念》

Schmidt's Interpretation of Marxian Knowledge Conception——Reading Alfred Schmidt's The Concept of Nature in Marx

考察斯密特以实践的中介性为基础对“模写说”进行的批判及其在客观的规律性和实践的目的性双重逻辑中对马克思认识论思想的阐释,可以发现,由于没有充分领会马克思的实践概念作为存在论视域的基本意义,斯密特对认识论的阐释并没有达到马克思思想的原则高度。事实上,马克思思想的基本意义,并不在于对近代哲学产生的认识论问题的推进和完美解决,而在于从根本上突破了近代认识论哲学的基本框架,宣布了此种哲学的解体和终结。

Through the discussion of Schimidt＇s Interpretation of Marxian conception of knowledge in this paper, we may find that Schimdt＇s interpretation of epistemology has not reached the height of Marxist principal ideas owing to his ignoring the fundamental meaning of the idea of practice in ontology. The fundamental significance of Marxian ideas lies not in the enhancement of epistemology arising in modern philosophy, but in the breakthrough of the basic framework of the modern epistemological philosophy.