地方政府竞争策略选择的博弈分析

Game Analysis of Competition Strategy Selection by Local Governments

市场化条件下地方政府具有独立的特殊利益,地方政府竞争是实现其特殊利益的主要方式。现实中地方政府之间的竞争往往陷入了地方保护的“囚犯困境”。通过建立“地方政府竞争策略选择的博弈模型”剖析了各地方政府的竞争策略选择过程,揭示了地方保护产生的内在机理。分析表明,地方政府利益与地方公共利益的差别是影响策略选择的关键,而中央政府的行为对于打破地方政府之间的“囚犯困境”至关重要。

In the context of market economy local governments have their independent interest and the competition between local governments is the major way to realize such interest. In real life, such competition, more often than not, has been transformed into the prisoner＇s dilemma of local protection. By building the game model of the competition strategy selection by local government, this paper analyses the selection process, discloses the internal mechanism of local protection. Tile analysis indicates that the difference between the interest of local government and that of local public interest is the key to deciding the selection of strategy but the behaviors of central government are critical to break the prisoner＇s dilemma between local governments.