带限制结盟的单调集对策

Monotonic set games with restricted coalitions

针对传统集对策模型对局中人合作的可能性没有限制这一问题,提出了带限制结盟的单调集对策,这里的“限制”是把有限局中人集N的每一个结盟映到其子集的单调映射。采用演绎推理的分析方法,讨论了带限制结盟的单调集对策的边缘值,该值是对经典集对策边缘值的一种推广,证明了带限制结盟单调集对策边缘值的一些性质。

In view of the problem that in a classical set game there are no restrictions to the cooperation possibilities of the players, the monotonic set games with restricted coalitions are proposed. A ＂restriction＂ is a monotonic projection assigned to each coalition of a finite player set N a subset of the finite player set. In this paper the method of syllogism is used to discuss the marginalistic value for monotonic set games with restricted coalitions, which is the extension of the classical one and is also proved to have some properties of the value.