信息成本与企业家的融资决策

Information Cost and Entrepreneur's Financial Decision

在项目的融资过程中,企业家可能面临两种选择:非市场融资与市场融资。尽管信息不对称是非市场融资的主要约束,但是市场融资可以改善彼此的信息结构。文章分析了企业家(内部人)与投资者(外部人)在不同信息结构下的不完全金融合同。分析后发现,投资者可以榨取的信息租与企业家的信息披露成本构成两种融资方式的主要融资成本;而项目所需的外部资本以及资本市场要求的回报率构成了企业家融资决策的决定性元素。事实上,若项目所需的外部资本越高,信息披露成本越低,市场融资要求的回报率越低和信息租越高,则企业家越有可能选择市场融资;反之,企业家可能选择非市场融资。此外,合谋与私人收益的存在也可能影响到企业家的融资决策。

In the financing process of a project, entrepreneur can choose either market financing or non-market financing. For non-market financing, asymmetric information is a central constraint, while market financing can improve each other＇s information structure. This paper analyzes the incomplete financial contracts between entrepreneur （insider） and investor （outsider） in different information structures. We find out that the main financing costs are information rent that investor can extract and information disclosure cost that entrepreneur can spend. Besides, outside funds that a project needs and rate of return that capital market requires are important determinants of entrepreneur＇s financial decision-making. In fact, the higher outside funds that a project needs, the lower the information disclosure cost, and the lower the rate of return that capital market requires, the higher the information rent, hence the more willingly entrepreneur chooses market financing, otherwise he can choose non-market financing. Meanwhile, the existence of collusion＇and private benefit can also influence entrepreneur＇s financial decision-making.