金字塔结构对自愿性信息披露程度的影响:来自家族控股上市公司的经验验证

Pyramidal Ownership and Voluntary Information Disclosure:Empirical Evidence from Chinese Family Controlled Listed Corporations

本文通过构建简单的理论模型研究了金字塔所有权结构对上市公司自愿性信息披露的影响,并以2002—2004年我国家族控股上市公司为样本进行了实证检验。研究发现终极控制人为了获取私人利益而倾向于抑制对外披露私人信息,即终极控制人的控制权和现金流权分离度越大、终极控制权比例越高,上市公司自愿性信息披露程度越低,而董事会在一定程度上起到了监督终极控制人行为的积极作用。

This paper studies the impact of pyramidal ownership structure on voluntary disclosure with the simple theoretical model and empirically examines the theoretical analysis results based on the sample of family controlled corporations from 2002 to 2004.The paper finds that the ultimate controlling shareholders will like to disclose less private information,that is the more divergence of the ultimate voting rights and cash flow rights and the larger ultimate voting rights,the lower level of voluntary disclosure will be.The board of directors has some active monitoring to the ultimate controlling shareholders.