期刊文献+

公司内部审计发展的进化博弈分析

Evolution Gaming Analysis on the Development of Company’s Internal Auditing
下载PDF
导出
摘要 内部审计是审计约束机制的一部分,而审计约束机制又是公司治理结构的一个子系统。因此,如果内部审计执行得好,就能降低所有者对代理人的监督成本,从而完善公司治理结构;反之亦然。进化博弈理论的研究表明:公司内部审计的发展速度取决于博弈方学习模仿的速度和能力,而这又取决于两个因素:一是作为学习模仿对象的已开展起来的公司内部审计的数量;二是已开展起来的公司内部审计的成功程度。 Internal auditing is part of the auditing restraint system, the latter being a sub-system of company management. Therefore, if internal auditing is well executed, monitoring cost of the owner over its agent will be substantially reduced, thus improving the company structure, and vice versa. Evolution gaming theory study shows that development of company's internal auditing relies on the imitation speed and capabilities of the competitors involved and influenced by the quantity already executed and the success degree of companies which have already undertaken internal auditing.
作者 郭立国
出处 《番禺职业技术学院学报》 2007年第1期36-39,共4页 Journal of Panyu Polytechnic
关键词 内部审计 进化博弈 模仿 internal auditing evolution gaming imitation
  • 相关文献

参考文献1

二级参考文献33

  • 1张维迎.《博弈论与信息经济学》[M].上海人民出版社,1999年版..
  • 2王则柯.《博弈论平话》,北京,中国经济出版社,1999.
  • 3Binmore, K., G. and Larry Samuelson, 1993.Musical Chaires: The Evolutionary Mechanics of Equilibrium Selection, Mimeo, University College London and Vniversity of Wisconsin.Madison.
  • 4Cressman, P., 1992. The Stability Concept of Evolutionary Game Theory (A Dynamical Approach). Lecture Notes in Biomathematics,94, Springer Berlin.
  • 5Cressman, P., 1996. Frequency - dependent Stability for Two -species Interactions. Theoretical Population Biology, 49, 189-210.
  • 6Gressman, P.,1990. Strong Stability and Density-dependent Evolufionarily Stable Strategies. Theoretical Population Biology, 145, 319- 330.
  • 7Friedman, D. ,1991. Evolutionary Games in Economies. Econometrica,59.
  • 8Fudenberg, D., 1998.Leaming in Games, Cambridge MIT Press.
  • 9Gilboa, I. and A. Matsui, 1991.Social Stability and Equilibrium.Econometrical.59, 869 - 867.
  • 10Hammerstein,P.1981.The Role of Asymmetries in Animal Contests.Anim.Behav.29.193-205.

共引文献55

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部