银行规模与经理人激励——基于中国信息和不确定性环境的理论研究

Bank Scale and Managers' Incentive—Research Based on China Context of Information and Uncertainty

本文基于委托代理激励理论,探讨不同规模银行中信息类别、不确定性信息与合同期限、政府行为等因素对经理人激励的影响。发现在中国这样的转型经济国家中,不确定性、非契约关系与政府行为使得银行规模与其竞争力和生存性的关系变得更加微妙。(1)相对大银行而言,小银行的发展面临更多的机会和风险;(2)长期合同下股权激励对于小银行经理人有着更为重要的意义;(3)客户经理的素质高低与一致性对于小银行激励效率的发挥至关重要;(4)我国小银行与地方政府天然密切的关系对其"软"信息获取作用很大,但同时也可能对其激励机制的长期有效性造成负面影响。

The article discusses the influence of bank scale,information category,contract terms and government behavior on bank managers' incentives.We find that in transition economies such as China,uncertainty,non-contract relation and government behavior make the relationship between bank scale and competitiveness incomprehensible.(1)Small banks face more opportunities and risks compared with larger ones.(2)The equity incentive of long term contract is important for managers especially for small banks.(3)Customer managers' quality and consistency are vital for small bank incentive efficiency.(4)The close relation between small banks and local government has significant role for soft information acquisition but may have long term negative impact on incentive effectiveness.