摘要
器件在加密过程中会产生功率、电磁等信息的泄漏,这些加密执行过程中产生的能量辐射涉及到加密时的密钥信息;文章首先简单分析了CMOS器件工作时产生功耗泄漏的机理,即与门电路内处理数据的汉明距离成正比;详细分析了DES加密过程的功耗轨迹,建立了DES加密过程中的功耗泄漏模型,并利用该模型建立了差分功耗分析(DPA)仿真平台;通过这个仿真平台在没有复杂测试设备与测试手段的情况下,对DES加密实现在面临DPA攻击时的脆弱性进行分析,全部猜测48位子密钥所须时间大约为6分钟,剩下的8位可以通过强力攻击或是附加分析一轮而得到;可见对于没有任何防护措施的DES加密实现是不能防御DPA攻击的。
A cryptographic device implementations leaks information such as power consumption, electromagnetic etc, which can be used by adversary to achieve secret keys. The power leakage principle of CMOS device is introduced, which is in direct portion to Hamming distance processed in gate. The power consumption of DES implementation is analyzed, and power consumption model is constructed, and at last, simulated platform of DPA is built for DES. This simulated platform can be used to analyze the vulnerability of DES implementation for DPA attacks, without complex measurements. It takes about 6 minis to guess all 48bit subkeys,＇and the rest 8bit can be achieved by collision attacks. It is obvious that DES imolementation without any countermeasures is vulnerable to DPA attacks.
出处
《计算机测量与控制》
CSCD
2007年第2期222-223,247,共3页
Computer Measurement &Control
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(60571037)
