Analysis of security protocols based on challenge-response

Security protocol is specified as the procedure of challenge-response, which uses applied cryptography to confirm the existence of other principals and fulfill some data negotiation such as session keys. Most of the existing analysis methods, which either adopt theorem proving techniques such as state exploration or logic reasoning techniques such as authentication logic, face the conflicts between analysis power and operability. To solve the problem, a new efficient method is proposed that provides SSM semantics-based definition of secrecy and authentication goals and applies authentication logic as fundamental analysis techniques, in which secrecy analysis is split into two parts： Explicit-lnformaUon-Leakage and Implicit-Information-Leakage, and correspondence analysis is concluded as the analysis of the existence relationship of Strands and the agreement of Strand pa- rameters. This new method owns both the power of the Strand Space Model and concision of authentication logic.