摘要
以委托——代理理论和信息经济学中的激励模型为基础,通过对政府和公务员两者在完全信息静态博弈下的混合战略分析,建立政府对公务员激励的博弈模型并进行拓展,利用数学分析的方法,对如何构建公务员的激励机制提出了建议。
This paper attempts to establish the incentive game mode that enables the government to motivate civil servants according to principal-agent theory and incentive model of information economics under the analysis of complete information static game and mixed strategy between government and civil servants. Also, it puts forward suggestions on establishing and developing incentive game model of civil servants by mathematic analysis method.
出处
《广东工业大学学报(社会科学版)》
2007年第1期17-19,共3页
Journal of Guangdong University of Technology(Social Sciences Edition)
关键词
公务员
激励机制
混合战略
博弈论
civil servants
incentive mechanism
mixed strategy
game theory