工会组织缺位下的工人个人谈判博弈——兼论我国民工的策略抑制问题

Employees’ Individual Negotiation with the Absence of the Labor Union

本文从博弈论角度,首先分析了工会组织缺位下工人的个人谈判意愿博弈,特别是存在“搭便车”现象时,该博弈将出现一个类似于“囚徒困境”的弈局,不管最终的收益如何,具有理性的工人总是选择“不谈判”。其次,在工人与雇主的个人谈判博弈中,由于拥有绝对的谈判优势,具有“自利性偏向”的雇主总是选择“拒绝”。最后,本文结合“民工荒”现象,分析当前我国民工由于工会组织缺位而导致的策略抑制问题。

Based on game theory, this paper firstly analyzes the employees＇ willingness to negotiate with the absence of the labor union, especially when there are ＂free riders＂. It is going to be a game similar to ＂Prisoners＇ Dilemma＂, that is, whatever the ultimate revenue is, rational employees would always choose ＂no negotiations＂. Secondly, in the negotiation game between the employees and the employers, those employers with ＂self-interest＂ preference would always choose ＂refuse＂, since they have absolute advantages in the negotiation. Finally, the paper analyzes the strategy restriction problem rising from the absence of the labor union, combining with the ＂Rural Workers＇ Short Supply＂ phenomenon in China.