摘要
尽管中国金融体系非常脆弱,但实际上中国却维持着金融系统的相对平稳运行。提出了一个博弈论的分析框架,运用进化博弈模型解释了这一金融脆弱性悖论。研究表明,悖论之所以存在是由于中国金融体系特别是银行体系背后隐含有政府的信誉担保。最后,提出了相关的政策建议。
In spite of fragility, Chinese financial system operates stably. An analysis framework in game theory was put forword. Using a evolutionary game theory model, the explanation of the f＇mancial fragility paradox was given. The result shows that the credit of government behind Chinese financial systems was the guarantee to this paradox. Finally, Some policy advice was proposed in response to that mentioned.
出处
《辽宁工学院学报》
2007年第1期58-61,共4页
Journal of Liaoning Institute of Technology(Natural Science Edition)
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70441004)
关键词
金融脆弱性
金融稳定
进化博弈
financial fragility
financial stability
evolutionary game theory
