激励扭曲与努力的无效分配——基于银行客户经理制模拟利润考核的有效性分析

Incentive Distortion and Inefficient Allocation of Effort:Based on the Availability Analysis of the Simulation Profit as Incentive Measure for Client Manager in Commercial Bank

文章首先通过运用多任务委托代理模型分析商业银行模拟利润考核制度的激励效应和扭曲效应,以及可能导致客户经理努力的无效分配;然后扩展分析银行模拟利润考核的有效性和模拟利润成本之间的权衡以及模拟利润的最优精确水平;最后结合我国商业银行的现实状况引申出与商业银行客户经理模拟利润考核制度相关的结论与政策建议。

Firstly, this paper analyzes the incentive effect and distortion effect of simulation profit check system in commercial bank Secondly, it analyzes the tradeoff between the availability of the simulation profit check system and cost of the simulation profit, and calculates the accuracy level of the simulation profit. Fi- nally, it gives some conclusions and policy suggestions.