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P2P-VCG:一种基于博弈论的带宽分配方案 被引量:8

P2P-VCG:A Game Theory Proposal for Bandwidth Allocation
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摘要 在引入虚拟货币的前提下,目前的P2P系统没有提供有效的带宽分配和计费方案,因此无法在服务开销和用户收益两个方面达到最优.以用户总体收益为研究点,利用博弈论中的VCG(Vickrey-Clarke-groves)算法规划P2P网络中的带宽分配和计费,并且视客户节点为执行带宽分配的主体,可以很好地克服上述问题,这种基于客户节点的带宽分配方案更能反映P2P网络的分布式特性.该带宽分配算法和基于VCG的计费机制达到了近似系统最优和用户激励两个目标,并且可以在实际系统中得到应用. Existing P2P systems can NOT achieve both individual rationality and system efficiency for the lack of efficient BA ( bandwidth allocation) and accounting proposal. In this paper E-currency and game theory are brought to P2P and the difficulty of BA in it is discussed. The utilities of all customers are used as a benchmark and two main novelties are brought forward: the first is that the VCG algorithm is brought in to P2P, and the second is that emphasis is put on how to choose bandwidth by clients. This kind of cllent-based bandwidth allocation proposal is much more suitable for P2P. The detailed BA & accounting algorithm is presented and its practical application is discussed.
出处 《计算机研究与发展》 EI CSCD 北大核心 2007年第1期78-84,共7页 Journal of Computer Research and Development
基金 国家发改委<CNGI示范工程2005年研究开发 产业化及应用试验>基金项目
关键词 P2P VCG 博弈论 用户激励 系统最优 P2P VCG game theory individual rationality system efficiency
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