具有网络外部性的双寡头市场的动态定价策略

Optimal Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of Network Externalities of the Duopolistic Marketing

本文通过将消费者对网络大小的预期引入消费者的效用函数,刻画了消费者预期如何影响市场潜量。然后,通过微分对策,分析了在垄断竞争的市场结构中的厂商如何在考虑到消费者对今后的预期时,如何动态的决定自己的价格和相应的策略。结果表明,随着消费者对网络增长预期的增大,将导致更大的网络规模和更低的初始价格。寡头的利润受消费者对其产量的预期的影响。

This paper analyzes the dynamic pricing decision of a duopolistic marketing, a new product or service whose consumption value increases with the expansion of the ＂network＂ of adopters. We characterize an optimal pricing strategy,which maximizes the present value of the duopolistic profits, subject to the dynamics of the demand for network access. The dynamics depends, among other factors, on the current price and consumer anticipations about future network growth. We examine the effects of changes in the growth anticipations and the discount rate on the optimal equilibrium access price and network size. It is shown that higher growth anticipations and a lower discount rate result in a lower equilibrium price and a larger network, which is similar to the monopolist marketing.