风险资本联合投资的激励契约设计

The Design of Incentive Contracts about Syndication in Venture Capital

针对风险资本在投资中期或晚期的联合投资激励契约问题,在风险投资家对项目已作了初步融资和了解条件下,建立了风险投资家之间的联合投资契约模型。分对称和非对称信息两种情形,就如何设计最优契约才能使联合投资双方都能真实地显示他们的信号进行了研究,分析了风险投资家的职业能力对联合投资契约的影响,并用算例进行了验证,为风险资本中期或晚期的联合投资提供了决策依据。

Contraposing the incentive problems of venture capital syndication in second and later stage,an contract model is set up among venture capitalists in case the lead venture capitalist has already a signal about the project＇s quality from his initial funding of the project. Under symmetric and asymmetric information, the model analyzes how the optimal syndication contracts can induce venture capitalists to truthfully reveal their signals to each other, vary with the quality of venture capitalists＇ expertise in evaluating projects,and provides numerical simulations. The model provides with decision--making gist in second and later stage syndications.